Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Sudan: Two Gulf Powers, Two Strategies, One Prolonged War
Sudan's civil war is now in its fourth year. Two Gulf powers with deep historical ties to the country Qatar and Saudi Arabia have shaped its trajectory in fundamentally different ways. One has mediated publicly while allegedly enabling Islamist networks behind the scenes. The other has hosted the most significant peace talks the conflict has produced while struggling to convert diplomatic leverage into durable ceasefires. Together, their overlapping but contradictory roles illustrate precisely why the conflict has resisted resolution.
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| Sudan's army chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani in Doha, Qatar |
Qatar: Networks, History, and the Islamist Question
Qatar's relationship with Sudan stretches back to the 1990s. ImArabic's July 2026 investigation documented that Doha hosted leaders of Sudan's National Islamic Front during the Bashir era, providing political, financial, and media support that helped consolidate Islamist rule creating what analysts describe as overlapping networks of influence linking Sudanese political elites with Doha that have persisted long after Bashir's removal. These are allegations drawn from analytical sources rather than confirmed official statements and should be treated as such.
Riyadh reportedly agreed to finance a $1.5 billion Pakistani arms package for Sudan’s army before asking Islamabad to cancel it.
— Frontline Radar (@frontline_radar) August 2, 2026
No government involved has confirmed the arrangement, and accounts differ over K-8 aircraft, drones, air-defence systems, armoured vehicles, and… pic.twitter.com/gok6oDT3WQ
What is documented is Qatar's genuine mediation track record. Qatar served as the principal mediator behind the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, a comprehensive peace process involving tribal leaders, armed movements, civil society, and the Sudanese government. That institutional memory gives Doha comparative advantages that other mediators lack. The Washington Institute confirmed that Qatar's influential network today includes RSF elements, tribal leaders, senior Islamists, and high-ranking military officers a breadth of contacts that gives it diplomatic flexibility no other actor can replicate.
The tension in Qatar's Sudan role is between this genuine mediation capacity and the allegations that its historical Islamist networks have been activated to shape post-war political outcomes. Fair Observer's June 2026 investigation alleged that Qatar backed SAF Deputy Commander Yasser al-Atta, who is integrating US-designated Islamist militias into the formal SAF command structure, reversing the 2019 revolution's defining institutional achievement. Qatar has not publicly confirmed these claims. Both the mediation capacity and the network allegations are real features of Qatar's Sudan engagement. Which dominates in practice determines whether Doha is part of Sudan's solution or part of its problem.
Saudi Arabia: The Necessary but Insufficient Peace Broker
Saudi Arabia facilitated the Jeddah Declaration in May 2023, which required both sides to safeguard civilians, permit humanitarian access, and comply with international law. It was the last time both parties sat down to negotiate substance in the same room. The declaration collapsed as fighting continued. Saudi Arabia has remained engaged co-leading the Quad with the US, Egypt, and the UAE, hosting MBS's April 2026 meeting with al-Burhan, and most recently establishing Jeddah as the ICRC's operational hub for Sudan humanitarian missions.