Turkey's Role in Sudan: Defence Ties, Drone Warfare, and the Red Sea Stakes
Turkey's involvement in Sudan's civil war is one of the most consequential and least scrutinised external interventions in the conflict. Ankara presents itself publicly as a humanitarian actor calling for peace. The documented evidence tells a more complex story.
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| A satellite image shows smoke rising from a burning oil storage area in Port Sudan, Sudan, 6 May 2025. |
The Defence Relationship
Sudan's Defence Industries System, MASAD, used the SAHA EXPO 2026 defence exhibition in Istanbul in May to publicly highlight what its head of communications described as "a very strong strategic relationship" with Turkish companies built over many years. The relationship has deep institutional roots. Turkey established a military training agreement with Sudan in 2017 and has maintained consistent defence industry engagement since. When SAF commander General al-Burhan visited Ankara on June 2, 2026, President Erdogan announced work was underway to deepen cooperation in trade, agriculture, energy, and defence, framing Turkey's role as driven by a desire to halt bloodshed and preserve Sudan's territorial integrity.
The Drone Evidence
The public framing diverges significantly from the documented military picture. Fair Observer's May 2026 investigation reported that documents allegedly revealed Baykar, the Turkish company behind the Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones, covertly funnelled at least $120 million worth of military equipment to the SAF, including drone systems and warheads. Baykar has not confirmed the figure. The humanitarian consequences, however, are independently verified. UN figures released in May 2026 confirmed that drones were responsible for more than 80 percent of recorded civilian deaths in Sudan's conflict during the first four months of 2026, killing at least 880 people. UN High Commissioner Volker Türk warned the escalating drone warfare could push the conflict into an even deadlier phase.
BREAKING: A Washington Post investigation reveals Turkey sold Sudan’s army over $110 million in Baykar drones and munitions while simultaneously presenting itself as a peace mediator in the civil war. pic.twitter.com/z0ztQtOO5N
— Eyal Yakoby (@EYakoby) July 30, 2026
ImArabic's structural analysis documented a logistical pipeline connecting Turkish defence industries, Egyptian ports and airports, and Sudanese military bases, with Egypt's Berenice Red Sea base identified as a consolidation point for Turkish military equipment before transfer into Sudan. The analysis also cited satellite intelligence sharing through Turkish Göktürk systems integrated into joint Egyptian-Turkish data centres in eastern Sudan. These are allegations drawn from investigative reporting and should be treated as such pending official confirmation.
Turkey's Strategic Interests
Horn Review's January 2026 analysis identified the driving logic behind Turkey's escalating SAF support: visible cargo deliveries to Port Sudan in early 2026 signalled Turkey's growing integration into a Saudi-led effort to suppress RSF insurgency and restore centralised control. Turkey's interest is not purely ideological. It is commercial and strategic. A SAF-controlled, unified Sudan would be a more reliable partner for Ankara's Red Sea access ambitions, its agricultural investment interests in Sudanese farmland, and its broader Africa policy positioning. Daily Sabah's analysis articulated the rationale directly: Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all view a fragmented Sudan controlled by militias as a threat to Red Sea basin stability, global maritime trade, and regional migration dynamics.